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1 Introduction 
In the classical n-agents model of Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie, it is stated the hy­
pothesis that the agents behave as price-takers. However, mathematically, it' is 
not possible to assume tha the influence of each agent is negligible in economies 
with a finite set of agents. 
Later, Aumann (1964) proposed the study of economies with a continuum of 
agents (also called atomles, continuum or perfectly competitive economies). The 
reason for this last name is that, in these models, the influence of each agent, 
or of a set of measure zero, is null because the integral do es not change if the 
behaviour of such a set of agents is modified. The mathematical elegance of 
this approach may not be immune to the criticism that, often enough, economic 
reality only allow us to distinguish a finite number of participants. 
A first attempt to solve this kind of criticism is made by Carda and Hervés 
(1993). They define what we can call a continuum n-types economy, that is, a 
continuum economy which is observed by the market as an economy with n types 
of agents. They prove that this later economy can be interpreted as a classical 
n-agents economy, and vice versa. 
In this paper, we consider a perfectly competitive economy, focusing on dif­
ferent discrete approaches that may be adopted) analyzing sorne implications on 
the veto mechanism. \Ve postulate that the market (or the observer) only dis­
tinguishes a finite number of different characteristics, that is, endowments and 
preference relations. So, the agents included in a same group or type are seen 
as all the same. It seems reasonable to consider the average endowment for all 
the agents belonging to the same type, and so we do. Meanwhile, it is not clear 
what preference is perceived by the observer in a set of agents that he considers 
of the same type. For example, the observer can look at a set of agents, that 
he detects as the same one, assigning them a preference defined by the mean 
of the whole agent seto Or else, the observer can estímate that a consumption 
bundle is prefered to another one, by all the agents he assesses as equal, if it is 
unanimously prefered. 
In order to formalize these ideas, to each continuun economy &c we assocÍate 
(for each n) a continuum economy &:, in which only a finite number, namely 2n , 
of different agent characteristics can be distinguished. To each economy &: we 
associate a diserete economy &n with 2n agents. In this way, we define different 
discrete approaches to continuum economies, by means of what we call average 
and unanimous preferences. We study sorne properties of all these preferences 
and \Ve analyze relations between the initial continuum economy and its di serete 
approaches. That is, we obtain results about allocations belonging to the core of 
the continuum economies in terms of the corresponding allocations in the core of 
the associated discrete economies (or in the core of the continuum economies in 
which only a finite number of different agent characteristics can be distinguished 
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by the observer or the market). Precisely, \Ve obtain ho\V the core of a continuum 
economy can be approximated, in some sense, by the sequen ce of the cores of 
the associated discrete economies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the model. In section 3 ~e 
study a first discrete approach to continuum economies, introducing the average 
preference. Specifically, we define the average preference, analyzing some of its 
properties, we prove the main results and we present so me examples. In section 
4 we follow a similar set up for the case of the unanimous preference. 
2 The marlel 
Let us consider apure exchange economy &e = ((I, A, J.l), w( t), ::St, t E 1) , having 
IRl as commodity space. (I, A, J.l) is an atomless positive, bounded measure 
space which represents the space of agents. For simplicity, we as sume that I is 
the real interval [0,1], A is the Lebesgue O"-algebra of subsets of I, and J.l is the 
Lebesgue measure. The consumption set of each agent t E I is X t = IR~, his 
initial endowment is w(t) E IR~, and his preference relation is ::St represented by 
a continuous utility function U(t,.) : IR~ - IR. 
Following Aumann (1964), \Ve suppose that the map w : I - IR~, that asso­
ciates to each agent his initial endowment is integrable, and that the functíon ::S, 
that associates to each agent t E I his preference relation ::St, is measurable, in 
the sense that if x, y : I - IR1 are feasible allocations in the economy &e, then 
the set {t E Ilx(t) >-t y(t)} is measurable. 
As we have noticed in the introduction, often enough, economic reality only 
allo\vs us to distinguish a finite number of different agent characteristics. So,our 
aim is to consider an economy with a continuum of agents, introducing several 
di serete approaches of this economy in order to analyze the implications that can 
be obtained from this simplification in relation to the veto mechanism. 
In this way, \Ve are interested in the core allocations of the initial economy 
&e, as limit core allocations of the di serete economies, depending on the diserete 
approach considered. 
For this, for each positive integer n, we define the continuum economy &~ in 
which only a finite number of different agents can be distinguished. Specifically 
and for technical reasons, let us consider that the set of agents I is divided into 2n 
pairwise disjoint subintervals, each of them representing a type of agent. That is, 
n 2n2 • 1 . 1 ]
I = WIr, where Ii = [Z ~n '2Zn )' if i =f. 2n , I!in = [ 2~ ,1. Each consumer 
,=1 
t E I is characterized in the economy &~ by his consumption set IR~, his initial 
endowment wn(t) = J.l(~f) ii'w(t)$(t), for all t E Ii, and his preference relation 
?:::~=>-i for all t E Ir. \Ve will refer to Ir as the set of agents of type i in the 
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economy t:~. 
Note that if f is a feasible allocation in t:e , then fn is a feasible allocation in 
t:~, where fn(t) = (JI) f f(t)d¡J,(t), for all t E Ji. Moreover, as fw(t)d¡i(t).=
!1 i Jr¡ JI 
lwn(t)d¡J,(t), one has that f is a feasible allocation in t:e iff fn is a feasible 
aHocation in t:~, for aH n. 
Let us consider the discrete economy t:n associated with the continuum econ­
omy t:~. That is, t:n is an economy with 2n agents, where ea eh agent i E 
{1, ... ,2n} is characterized bywi =wn(t), and Ur Un(t,·), with t E Ji. 
Observe that one allocation f in our economy t:e , can be interpreted either 
as an allocation fn in t:;, or as an allocation xn = (Xl,"" X2n ) in t:n, where 
xi = !1(~i) lrf(t)d¡J,(t), equivalently xi = fn(t), con t E Ji· ReciprocaHy, an 
allocation X in t:n can be interpreted as an allocation f in t::, where f is the step 
function defined by f(t) = Xi, if t E Ji. 
Remark. \Ve have assumed that the real interval [0,1] is divided into 2n subin­
tervals of equallength. Obviously, this kind of partition is made for technical 
reasons. \Vhat it is important to note is that if the initial economy t:c has a 
finite number of different characteristics, then it may be transformed in order to 
garantee that, for n big enough, the sequence t:; of economies with 2n types is 
constant and equal to t:c' 
3 Average Preference 
3.1 Definition and sorne properties. 
Let us consider that for each n the preference relation of each agent t E J, tf, 
is represented by the utility function Un(t,x) = !1(~i)l['U(t,x)d¡J,(t), whoever 
t E Ji may be. In this case, we will call tf as average preference. All the agents 
of t:; belonging to Ji are abserved as equal, with endowments and preferences 
given by the average of all the agents of Ji. 
Next we show some properties of this average preference. 
1. 	 Observe that if U( t,·) is continuous in X for almost aH t E J, then by 
the dominated convergence theorem we can obtain that un(t,·) is also 
continuous in x, for aH t E J and whatever n may be. 
2. 	 Observe that if U(t,·) is a monotone (resp. strictly monotone) function for 
almost all t E J, un (t, .) is a monotone (resp. strictiy monotone) function 
for all t E J and all n. 
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3. Note that if U(t,·) is a concave function for alrnost all tE I, then un(t,.) 
is a concave functíon for all t E I and all n. However, the quasi-concavity 
of U(t,·) for alrnost aH t E I does not irnply the quasi-concavity of the 
average preferences un(t,·). 
4. 	 By other way, Lebesgue differentiation theorern allows us to conclude that 
wn(t) converges to w(t) pointwisely, and given x E IR~ it is verified that 
un (t, x) converges to U(t, x), for alrnost all t E I. Therefore, using Egoroff 
theorern, one hasthat wn (resp. un(·,x)) converges to w(t) (resp. to 
U(·,x)) alrnost uniforrnly. 
5. 	 Observe that for each n we have that 1nwn(t)d¡J,(t) = 1rw(t)d¡J,(t), what­
. 	 , 
ever i E {l, ... , 2n } rnay be. 
6. 	 Having into account the results in García and Hervés (1993), you can de­
duce that if the utility function U( t, .) is concave for alrnost all t E I, 
then ((x}, ... ,X2n ),P) is a walrasían equilibriurn for the econorny En with 
2n agents iff (j,p) is a walrasian equilibriurn for the continuurn econorny 
E:. You can also conclude that (XI, ... , X2n) is ari Edgeworth equilibriurn 
for the econorny En iff f is a core aHocation in the econorny E:. 
3.2 Main results 
As we have pointed out, \Ve are interested in studying the relationship between 
Ee and En related to the veto rnechanisrn. Specifically, in this section we prove 
the following: given an allocation f in the econorny Ee, it is verified that if the 
corresponding allocation xn E Core(En ) for aH n 2::: no, then f E Core(Ee ), where 
xi 	= JL(~i)l['f(t)d¡J,(t). In order to obtain this result, we state sorne previous 
facts. 
Lemma 3.1 Letgn,g: I -+ IR! be integrablefunctions, such thatgn(t) converges 
to g(t) almost everywhere. Then, for each e > O there exist k(e) > O, n(e), and 
Je e I, with J1(Je ) < e, such that Ilgn(t)lI, IIg(t)11 < k(e), for all t <t. Je , and for 
all n ?:. n(e). 
Prooi. By Chebysev inequality, there exists k such that J1( {t E IlIlg(t)1I > 
k}) < ~. On the other hand, by Egoroff theorern there exists J e I, with 
JL( J) < ~, su eh that gn converges to 9 uniforrnly on I \ J. Now it is enough to 
take Je = JU{t E IllIg(t)11 > k}, and k(e) > k. 
Q.E.D. 
Let us consider now a feasible aHocation f : I -+ IR~ in the econorny Ee' For 
each n, let fn : I -+ IR~ be the feasible allocation in the eeonorny E;-, given by 
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jn(t) = J.1(~i)lrj(t)d¡.J(t), for each agent t E Ii. 
Given Z E fQl we define r(z) {t E IIU(t,z +w(t)) > U(t,j(t))}, and 
rn(z) = {t E Ilun(t,z + wn(t)) > un(t,jn(t))}, for each n E IN. Let Z'= 
{z E ~llJ.1(r(z)) = O}. So, J.1(UzEZ r(z)) = O. Finally, for each agent t E I, let 
1/;(t) = {z E IReIU(t,z +w(t)) > U(t,j(t))}. 
Lemma 3.2 Let S be a coalition oj agents blocking the allocation j in the econ­
Qmy te' Then¡ jor each i E {1, ... ,i + 1}, there exist ai E ~+, Zi E fQe, and 
l+1 l+1 
ti E S= S \ UzEZ r(Z), such that Lai = 1, Laizi = O, and Zi E 1/;(t¡). 
i=l i=l 
Proof. As S blocks j, there exists 9 : S -+ IR~, such that hg(t)d¡.J(t) < 
h w(t)d¡.J(t) and g(t) ?-t j(t), for almost all tES. Because ofJ.1(UzEZ r(z)) 0, 
\Ve can deduce that S is a coalition which al so blocks j by the same allocation 
g. On the other hand, it is verified that 
~ ~(g(t) - w(t))d¡.J(t) E ca ((g - w)(5))
J.1(S)Js 
Therefore, °E ca (UtES 1/;(t)) . By Caratheodory's theorem, one obtains that 
there exist a¡ ~ 0, and Z¡ E 1/;(t¡), with ti E 5, i = 1, ... ,i + 1, such that 
l+1 
0= La¡zj. 
i=l 
Let us show that wecan take ai E fQ+. In fact, for each k E IN, let a: = E[ka¡+ 
1], where E[t] denotes the entire part of the real number t. Let z[ = k~¡ Zi E IRl , 
a¡ 
As lim k~i 1, \Ve obtain that: lim zf = Z¡. Then, by the continuity of the 
~oo~ ~oo 
preferences, there exists ka such that zf E 1/;(ti), for all i E {1, ... , i + 1}, and 
(+1 l+1 
for all k ~ ka. Moreover, it is verified that La:zf = Lka¡Zi = 0, where a7 are 
;=1 i=l 
integer numbers, for all i E {1, ... , i + 1}. 
Finally, let us show that we can take Z¡ E ~l. For each i, let (zi) be a 
sequence which converges to Z¡, with zi E ~l, and zi ~ Zi. By the continuty of 
the preferences, there exists no such that zi E 1/;(ti), for all i E {1, ... , i +1}, and 
(+1 
nfor all n ~ no. By construction, we have that Laizi = -1'\ with r ~ O. The 
i=l 
nmonotonicity of the preferences implies that Z{ +r E 1/;(ti), for all i E {1, ... ,i}, 
and all n ~ no. 
Q.E.D. 
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Let us denote by C(IR~) the set of aH real continuous functions defined on IR~. 
We consider on C(IR~) the compact-open topology. This is a metric space. In 
fact, 1] is a metric of this space, being '11 defined by 
00 I f(x) - g(x) I
r¡(J,g) = ¿ 2-nr¡n(J,g), where r¡n(J,g) = sup I f() () I 
n::;;:! Ilxll~n 1+ x 9 x 
Let U : 1 -+ C(IR~) be the function that associates to each agent t E 1 his 
utility function U(t, .). Unless we state the contrary, in the rest of the paper we 
assume that U is continuous. 
Lernrna 3.3 For almost all t E 1, it is verified that un(t,.) converges to U(t,.) 
uniformly on compact subsets of IR~. 
Proo!. Given x E IR~, by Lebesgue differentiation theorem, it is verified that 
un(t,x) converges to U(t,x) for almost all tEl. In particular, for each x E Q;)~ 
there exists J(x) el, with ¡.t(J(x)) = 1, such that un(t,x) converges to U(t,x) 
for aH tE J(x). Let J = nXE<D~ J(x). Then ¡.t(J) = 1 and un(t,x) converges to 
U( t, x) for all t E J, whatever x E Q;)~ may be. 
Let us see that un(t,x) converges to U(t,x) for all t E J, for any x E IR~. 
For this, given x E IR~ let (xk) e Q;)~ be a sequence such that xk -+ x. By the 
continuityofthefunctions un(t,.) wecan deduce that limun(t,xk) = un(t,x)
k-oc 
for all n and for all tEl. It is also verified that lim un(t, xk) = U(t, xk) for 
n-oo 
all k and for aH t E J. Moreover, this convergence is uniform on k. In fact, 
1et]{ = {U(·,xk),k E IN}. As U is continuous, ]{ is a equicontinuous set. 
Therefore, by Ascoli-Arzela's theorem, ]{ is a relatively compact subset of C(1). 
As the inclusion of C(1) in Loo (1) is continuous, ]{ is a relatively compact subset 
of Loo(1). This implies (see Dunford-Schwartz, IV.S.lS) that un(t, Xk) converges 
to U(t, xk ), uniformly on k . Applying Moore's lemma (see Dunford-Schwartz, 
1.7.6), lim limun(t,xk) = lim limun(t,xk) = limU(t,xk) = U(t,x). So, 
n-oo k-oc k-oc n-oc k-oc 
limun(t,X) = lim limun(t,Xk) = U(t,X). Therefore un(t,x) converges to 
n-oc n-oc k-oc 
U(t,x) for almost all t E 1 and all x E IR~. 
Final1y, let x E IR~ and (xm) e IR~, such that xm -+ x. Reasoning as before, 
we obtain that lim un(t,xm) = U(t,x), for all t E J. In particular, if n = m, it(n,m) 
15 verified that limun(t,xn) = U(t,x), for all tE J. That is, un(t,·) converges 
n-oc 
continuously to U(t,·) for each x E IR~. Equivalently, un(t,.) converges to U(t,.) 
uniformly on compact subsets of IR~. (See Royden, problem 9.40). 
Q.E.D. 
Lernrna 3.4 Let 1{ be a compact subset of IR~. lt is verified that un(.,.) con­
verges to U (', .) almost uniformly on 1 and uniformly on ]{. That is, for each 
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e > O there exists JE: e J, with ¡t(JE:) > 1 - e, such that un(-,.) converges to 
U(·,·) uniformly on JE: X K .. 
Proaf. By lernrna 3.3, there exists J e J, with ¡t(J) = 1, such that for all t E J it 
is verified that un(t,x) converges to U(t,x) for all x E IR~, and this convergence 
is uniforrn on K. Given k, m positive integers, we define 
Jk,m = {t E J 11 Un(t,x) -U(t,x) 1< ~, for all n ~ k, x E K} 
Then Jk,m e Jk+l,m for all m and k. Moreover, by the uniforrn convergence on K 
for all t E J, we have that J = Uk=1 Jk,m for aH m. So, for each e > O and for each 
m, there exists k( m) such that ¡t( J \ Jk(m),m) < e2-m . Let JE: = n~=l Jk(m),m' 
Then, ¡t(J \ JE:) < E and besides 1un(t,x) - U(t,x) 1< m-I, for all n ~ k(m) 
and for aH tEJE:' Therefore, Unh .) converges to U(', .) uniforrnly on JI!: X K. 
Q.E.D. 
Next we state one of the rnain results in this section. 
Theorem 3.1 Let f be a feasible allocation in the economy íc' FOi each n E IN, 
lel us consider the discrete economy í n and the allocation xn, defined by xi = 
p(~r)l['f(t)d¡J,(t). Jf xn E Core(ín) for all n ~ no, then fE Core(íc )' 
Proaf. Let us suppose that f ~ Core(íc )' Then, there exists a coalition S 
blockíng f. By lernrna 3.2, there exist ai E ~+ and Zi E t/;(t¡), i 1, ... , e+ 1, 
l+1 l+1 
with ti E S= s \ UzEZ f(z) and Lai = 1, such that 0= La¡z¡. 
¡=1 i=1 
By the definition of S, as Z¡ E t/;(t¡), we have that ¡t(r(Zi)) > O. So, there 
exists a > O, such that ¡t(r(Z¡)) ~ a for all i E {1, ... ,e + 1}. It is also verified 
that Z¡ E t/;(t) for all t E r(Z¡), that is, U(t,Z¡ +w(t)) - U(t,j(t)) > O for all 
t E f(z¡). Therefore, there exists B¡ e r(z¡), with ¡t(B¡) < ~, and there exists 
8> O, such that U(t, Z¡ + w(t)) - U(t, f(t)) ~ 8 for all t E r(Z¡) \ B j • 
By lernrna 3.1, there exist A e J, no and a cornpact K e IRl , such that 
p(A) < ~, f(t),jn(t),Z¡ + wn(t) E K, for aH t E A and for all n ~ no. Let us 
recaH that fn( t) = xi, if t E Jr. By lernrna 3.4, there exists a set of agents B e J, 
with p(B) < ~, such that fn(t) f(t), wn(t) w(t) and un(t,x) U(t,x)-lo -lo -lo 
uniforrnly, for all t ~ B and for all x E K. 
For each E> O,let us consider the rnap r.p(., E) : J -lo IR+, given by 
r.p(t, E) = sup IU(t,x+y)-U(t,x) 1 
xel( 
IIYUS:' 
Note that r.p(t,E) > O for all E > O and r.p(t,E) converges to O whenever E -lo O. 
Besides, for each E, the rnap r.p(., E) is rneasurable. Let JI!: = {t E Jlr.p(t,e") < n. 
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So, if e < e' then l!:, e le. As 1 = U!: l!:, there exists eo such that p(I \ leo) < ~ 
and <p( t, eo) < ~ for all t E leo. 
Let r'(Zi) = (r(Zi) nleo) \ (AUBUBd. Then p (r'(Zi)) > ~. Moreover, ¡n 
(resp. wn ) converges to f (resp. to w) uniformly on r'(Z¡). So, there exists nI 
such that IIfn(t) f(t)ll, IIwn(t) - w(t)11 < eo for all n ;::: nI and t E f'(Zi). We 
obtain that if n ;::: max{no, nIJ then U(t, Zi +wn(t)) U(t, fn(t)) > ~ for all 
t E r'(Zi). By the uniform convergen ce of un(t,x) with t E r'(Z¡) and x E K, 
thereexists n2 such that I un(t,x) - U(t,x) 1< ~,for all x E K, t E r'(Z¡) and 
n ;::: n2' 
Let ñ = max{no, nll n2}' If n ;::: ñ, it is satisfied that un(t,Z¡ + wn(t))­
un(t,Jn(t)) > 0, for all t E r'(Z¡). This implies that there exists n such that 
r'(Zi) e rn(Z¡), for all í E {1, o .. ,e +1} and n ;::: n. Moreover, p (rn(Zi)) > ~. 
On the other hand, for each i we can write ai = *, with /3¡, /3 E IN and /3i ::; /3. 
By the definition of r n , it is verified that for each n and í there exists a type 
subset Tt e {1, o o 2n}, such that rn (Z¡) = UjeTt lj. As p(Ii) converges to zero o , 
when n goes to 00, but simultaneously p (fn(z¡)) > ~ > 0, we obtain that there 
exists n* such that Card(Tr) > /3, for all í and n ;::: n* Let us consider Ji e Tio 
with Card(Jr) = /3io Given n ;::: n*, let yn be an allocation that associates to each 
agent j E Ji the consumption vector yj = Z¡ +wn(tj,¡), with tj,í E lj e rn(Zi), 
1 ::; j ::; /3j. Let us show that the coalition Jn = uf~i Ji can obtain the allocation 
yn. Precisely, 
i+l f3i i+l i+l (Ji ¿ ¿ (Zi +Wn(tj,i)) ¿/3iZi +¿ ¿wn(tj,¡) 
i=1 j=1 i=1 í=1 j=l 
i+l i+l (Ji 
= /3¿ai Z¡+¿ ¿wn(tj,¡) 
i=1 i=1 j=1 
i+l (Ji 
= ¿¿wn(tj,¡) 
i=lj=1 
Therefore, \Ve conclude that for n ;::: n* the coalition Jn block s the allocation 
xn in the economy En. 
Q.E.D. 
Let S e A. As in Hervés and Moreno (1996), we say that an allocation belongs 
to the S-Core of the economy Ec if it is not blocked by any coalition S E S. Let 
sn denote the o--algebra that is generated by the subintervals li, i = 1, ... , 2n. 
Let S = U~=1 sn. 
Corollary 3.1 Let f be a feasible allocation in the economy Eco Given n E IN, 
we consider in the 2n types continuum economy E~ the allocation fn, defined by 
¡n(t) = x{ ift E Ir. lf fn E sn-Core(E~) for all n ;::: no, then fE Core(Ec)' In 
particular, if fn E Core(E~) for all n ;::: no! then f E Core(Ec)' 
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Proof. It is enough to notice that xn E Core(t'n) iff fn E sn-Core(t'~), and that 
Core(t':) e sn-Core(t'~). 
Q.E.D. 
Remark. Note that all the previous results remain true if U is piecewise con­
tinuous. We have assume U to be continuous only for simplicity. 
\Ve shall show in subsection 3.3 that the converse of theorem 3.1 and coroHary 
3.1 do not hold. In spite of this, we can obtain sorne weaker converse results. 
This is now our aim. 
Following Kannai (1970), we denote by P the set of all preferences which are 
derived from complete, refiexive, transitive, strictly mono tone and continuous 
preorders, defined on IR~. Given >-E P, it can be represented by a continuous 
utility function as follows. For each x E IR~ there exists an unique vector y on 
the principal diagonal of IR~, such that x rv y. Let U( x) = IIyll, where 11-11 is the 
euclidean norm. U is continuous and it is characterized by U(x) = IIxll on the 
principal diagonal. Moreover, the constant k = Vi satisfies O ~ U(x) ~ kllxl!' 
for all x E IR~. 
Let us denote by U the set of aH the utility functions obtained as aboye. It is 
verified that the mínimal topology on P which makes the set {(x,y, >-)Ix >- y} 
open in the product space IR~ x IR~ x P, is induced by the metric on P 
U} (x) - U2 (x)p(>-¡, >-2) = max I 1 11 IF 1 xER~ + x 
being U¡ belonging to U and representing >-¡. This topology has a countable 
basis. Moreover, the map >-: 1 -+ P is measurable iff it is measurable in the 
Aumann sense, which we have assumed in section 2. 
Theorem 3.2 Let (tn) e P be a sequence of preferences and let tE P. Then, 
P(tn, t) converges to zero iff Un converges to U uniformly on compact subsets 
of IR~, being Un) U the utility functions belonging to U which represent t:n and 
t, respectively. 
Proof. First, we prove the necessary condítion. Let us suppose that P(t:n, t) 
converges to zero. Let e > Oand J{ a compact subset of IR~. Then, there exists 
r such that J{ e B(O, r) = {x E IR~; IIxll < r}. "Ve take e= 1: r2 ' As tn~t, 
there exists no such that p(t:n) t) ~ e, for aH n 2: no. 
On the other hand, ít is verified that 
IUn(x)-U(x) 1 2 ma.~ I Un (x) - U (x) 1 ~ max 11 11 2 max (1 + 1I xII)xEn 	 xEK 1 + x xEK 
< 	 max 1 Un(x) - U(x) 1 (1 + r2) 
xER~ 1 + IIxll2 
1II 
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Therefore, maL':' 1Un(x) - U(x) 15 e, for aH n ;::: no. This allows us to conclude 
xEn 
that Un converges to U uniformly on compact subsets of IR~. 
"Ve prove now the sufficient condition. Let us suppose that Un converges 
to U uniformly on compact subsets of IR~. As Un E U for aH n, and U E U, 
there exists a constant k, which only depends on e, such that Un(x) 5 kllx!! and 
2kr 
U(x) 5 kl!x\!, for aH n and x E IR~. Let e > Oand r > 1 such that 1 + r 2 < e. 
As Un converges to U uniformly on l( = {x E IR~; IIxll 5 r}, there exists no such 
that, ma¿c 1Un(x) - U(x) 15 e, for aH n ;::: no· 
rE" 
By the definition of J(, \Ve obtain that ~E~ 1 Un~~ i!xf¡;X)! < e, for aH 
n ;::: no. And, if x ct. J(, as Ilxll > r > 1, it is verified that 
IUn(x) - U(x) 1< 1Un(x) I+ IU(x) 1< 2kllxll 2kr 
1 + IIxl12 - 1 +IIxll2 - 1 + IIx\!2 1 +r2 
IUn(x) -This aHows us to conclude that max -'----'--'---'""'---'.....;.U(x) I 5 E:, for aH n ;::: no. 
XER~ 1 + IIxll2 
Therefore, p(t:n, t:) converges to zero. 
Q.E.D. 
Remark. Let 4> : IR+ -+ IR+ be an increasing and continuous function. Then, in 
the theorem above, Un and U can be replaced by 4> o Un and 4> O U, respectively. 
Even more, if 4>n : IR+ -+ IR+ is a sequen ce of increasing and continuous functions, 
such that 4>n converges to 4> uniformly on compact subsets, then Un and U can 
also be replaced by 4>n o Un and <P O U, respectively. 
Corollary 3.2 Por each agent t E l, let (resp. t:~) be his preference re/ation 
in the economy fe (resp. f~) , represented by the utility functíon U(t,·) (resp. 
un(t, .)). Let us suppose that U(t,·) E U for almost all t E l. 
Then p(t:f, t:t) converges to zero, for almost al! t E l. 
Proof. As U(t,.) E U for almost aH t E l, we have that U(t,x) = ¡¡xII, for aH 
x in the principal diagonal of IR~, for almost all t E l. So, it is verified that 
un(t,·) E U, for all tE l and n, because un(t,x) = Ilxll, for all x in the principal 
diagonal of IR~ o 
On the other hand, by lemma 3,3, un(t,.) converges to U(t, o) uniformly on 
compact subsets of IR~, for almost aH t E l. Applying theorem 3.2, we conclude 
that p(t:f, t:t) converges to zero, for almost all t El. 
Q.E.D. 
It is important to notice that the hypothesis of the strict monotony of the 
preferences can not be omited, as we will see in subsection 3.30 
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On the other hand, this result allows us to obtain a weaker converse version 
of corollary 3.1 in terms of the e-Core concept stated in Kannai (1970). For 
this, given a, b E IRt' let a 8 b be the vector in IR~ whose k-th coordinate is 
max{ak - bk,O}. Given e > O, it is said that an aHocation f belongs to the'e­
Core of the economy Ee , and we denote fE e-Gore(Ec), if g(t) >-t f(t) for almost 
all t E S implies that the inequality hg(t)d¡J,(t) < h w(t)d¡J,(t) e does not hold. 
Corollary 3.3 Let U(t,·) E U for almost al! t E J. Let f : J -+ IR~ be a 
feasible allocation in the economy Ee' For each n let fn : J -+ IR~ be defined by 
¡7l.(t) = J.l(~i)lrf(t)d¡J,(t), for each agent t E Ji· 
Jf f E Gore(Ec), then for each e > O there exists no, such that for all n ;:::: no 
it is verified that fn belongs to the e-Gore of E~. So, r E e sn-G ore( E~), for 
al! n 2: no. 
Proof. \Ve recall that fn is a feasible allocation in E: and fn(t) converges to f(t) 
for almost all t E J. On the other hand, {w,w n : n E IN} is a weakly sequentially 
compact subset of P(J), because wn converges weakly to w. So, corollary 3.2 
and theorem D in Kannai (1970) prove our statement. 
Q.E.D. 
Remarks. Note that corollary 3.2 and other results in Kannai (1970) allow us to 
conclude, under the hypothesis stated in corollary 3.3, the following propositions: 
• 	 Let ¡ E t-Gore(Ec )' Then for aH e > O there exists no, such that for aH 
n;:::: no it is verified that fn E (c+€)-Gore(E~). 
Therefore, fn E (e + t) - Sn..Gore(E~), for all n ;:::: no. 
• 	If fn E e-G ore( E~) for all n, then for all e > Oit is verified that 
f 	E (e + e) - Gore(Ec ) 
Observe that these results are weaker versions of the reciprocals of corollary 
3.3 and theorem 3.1, respectively. 
3.3 Sorne counterexarnples 
Example 3.1. Our first example shows that the converse results of theo­
rem 3.1 or else corollary 3.1 are not true. That is to say, the fact that f 
belongs to Gore(Ec ) does not garantee that fn belongs to sn-Gore(E~) for n 
large enough. To prove our point, let a and (3 satisfy O < a < (3 < 1) and 
11 

such that for infinitely many n, that is, for a sequence n = nk, and for all 
i = i(n),j = j(n) E {1, ... , 2n }, with i "# j, such that a E Ii, and 13 E Ij, it is 
verified that ¡.t ({t E Ii It < a}) > ¡.t ({t E Ii It > a}), and ¡.t ({tE Ij It < f3}) > 
¡.t ({tE Ij It > f3}) . By Cantor's nested intervals theorem we can take a ando 13 
as aboye. 
Let us consider the economy &e with the commodity space IRz. Each agent 
t E [0,1 J is characterized by his initial endowment w(t) and his preference relation 
represented by the utility function U(t,(x,y)), defined as follows 
(1, O) if t < a or t > 13 
w(t) { (0,1) if a < t < 13 
2x +y if t < a or t > 13 
U(t, (x,y)) = l'f{ X +2y a < t < 13 
It is easy to prove that the allocation f, given by f(t) = w(t), belongs 
to COre(&e)' However, the subsequence (nk) aboye, verifies that fnk '/:. snk_ 
Coree&;-k) whatever nk may be. In fact, for each nk the coalition Snk = ri k UIi" 
blocks the alIocation fn k via 9nk in the economy &;-k, being 
with cnk > 0, cnk little enough. 
Example 3.2. Note that, in example 3.1, \Ve can get that fn '/:. sn-Core(&~) 
for all even number n, or r '/:. sn-Core(&~) for all odd number n, but not both 
of them simultaneously. )Jow, following a similar idea, we define an economy &e, 
such that there exists fE Core(&c), but r '/:. sn-Core(&;-) for all n. 
Let a11 az, 1311 f3z, with °< al < a2 < 131 < 132, such that: 
For aH odd n and for each i = i(n),j = j(n) E {1, ... ,2n }, with i"# j, 
such that al E Ii, and az E Ij, it is verified that ¡.t ({t E Ii It < a¡}) > 
¡.t({tEIilt>ad), and ¡.t({tE Ijlt< a2}) <¡.t({tEIj!t>az}). 
For all even n and for each h = h(n),k = k(n) E {1, ... ,2n}, with h"# 
k, such that 131 E Ií:, and 132 E Ir, it is verified that ¡.t ({t E Ih It < f3d) < 
p({t E Ihl t > f3d), and ¡.t({t E Ikl t < f3z}) > ¡.t({t E Ikl t > f32})' 
Let the economy &e with IR2 as commodity space. Each agent t E [O, 1] is 
characterized by his initial endowment w(t) and his utility function U(t, (x, y)), 
gi\'en by the following formulae 
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(1, O) if t E [O, al) U[,811 (2) U[,82, 1]
w(t) { (0,1) if tE [aI,,81)U[a2,,82) 
2x +y if t E [O, aI) U[,8I, (2) U[,82, 1]
U(t,(x,y)) = { x +2y if t E [al, ,81) U[a21 ,82) 
In the econorny E;n+1, while all the agents of type i2n+1 prefer the first corn­
rnodity, all the agents oí type i2n+1 prefer the second one. On the other hand, 
in the econorny E;n while all the agents oí type h2n prefer the first cornrnodity, 
all the agents of type k2n prefer the second one. 
It is not hard to show that the allocation j, given by j(t) = w(t), belongs to 
Core(Ec). However, jn ~ sn-Core(E-;) for all n. In fact, for each n the coalition 
S2n+1 = I¡n+1 UI¡n+l blocks the allocation j2n+1 via 92n+1 in the econorny E;n+1, 
and the la coalition S2n = Ir UIr blocks j2n via 92n in the econorny E;n+1, 
where 9n is defined as foHows 
= {j2n+1(t) + (é2n+1, -é2n+1) if t E I~:!: 
j2n+1(t)+(-é2n+1,é2n+I) if tEIJ2:!~ 
being é n any positive real nurnber verifying 9n(t) > Ofor all n. 
Observe that, in both exarnples aboye, U and w are piecewise continuous func­
tions. Ho'wever, it is not difficult to show that U and w can be taken continuous 
functions, leading us to the sarne clairn. 
Example 3.3. The last exarnple shows that, in general, the strict rnonotony 
assurned on preíerences tt can not be deleted. In particular, our next exarnple 
proves that for aH agent t in a positive rneasure subset of 1, the sequen ce of 
average preferences (tf) converges, in the Kannai sense oí the rnetric p, to a 
preference t~#tt . 
For this, let us consider an econorny Ee with a single cornrnodity and let J( 
be a Cantor subset oí 1, with 11(J() > O. For each agent t E 1, let U(t,·) be his 
utility function, given by 
if x:S;l 
U(t, x) - if x 2:: 1 and tE J( 
{ 1+ a,:x - 1) if x 2:: 1 and tEI\J( 
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00 
being a:t = rnin{t - ak, bk - t} if t E Jk = (ak, bk), where I \ K = UJk. 
k=l 
It can be verified the following claims: 
Claim 1. If we consider on C(IR+) the cornpact-open topology, then the function 
U : I -+ C(IR+), which associates to each agent t E I his utility function U(t, '), 
is a continuous function. 
Claim 2. As I \ K is an open and dense subset of I, then Jl (Ir n(I \ K)) > O, 
for aH n and i. On the other hand, U(t,.) is a non decreasing function for all 
t E I, and an strictly increasing function for all t E 1 \ K. Now, we recall that if 
to E Ir, then un(to,x) = Jl(~nirU(t,x)dp(t). 
Therefore, un(t,.) is an strictly increasing utility function for all n and all 
agent t E I, due to the fact that I \ J( is an open and dense subset of l. 
Claim 3. Let t~ be the average preference relation represented by un(t, .). 
nThen, the utility function U ( t, .) E U, which represents t~ is defined by 
Un(t, x) = x 
Claim 4. For all agent t E J( it is verified that p(t~, t~) = 0, for all n, where 
t~ is represented by U'(t,x) = x. Obviously tt#t~ . 
Claim 5. The rneasure of J( can be chosen taking any value les s than 1. 
4 Unanimous Preference 
4.1 Definition and sorne properties. 
Let us consider now that for each n the preference relations t n in the econorny
E: are defined as foHows 
x tr y <=> x tt y for alrnost all t E II(to)o 
being II(to) the real subintervaI, such that to E II{to)' In this case, we will refer to 
>-~ as unanirnous preference. This preference states that a consurnption vector 
is prefered to another one if it is unanirnously prefered by all the corresponding 
set of agents. 
Let >-i=t~, with t E Ir. 
Next \Ve show sorne properties of this average preference. 
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1. 	 If x is unanimously prefered to y, then x is prefered to y with the average 
preference which we have defined in section 3. 
2. 	The unanimous preference relation tr is not complete. In fact, if we haye 
p({t E Iilx >-t y}) > O and p({t E Iilx -<t y}) > O, then x can not be 
compared to y in the economy E~ for the agents of type i. 
3. 	 t~ and >-f are transitive for al! n and t E l. 
4. 	Let t E Ii. The strict preference relation >-r and the indifference relation 
""'f are given by 
x >-f y {::} X tt y for almost all t E Ii and p ( {t E Ii Ix >-t y}) > O 
x ""'f y {::} x ""'t Y for almost all t E Ii 
5. 	Let to E Iro. It is verified that x t~O y iff x tr y for all t E Iro and for all 
n 2: no. Note that, although the equivalence remains true if tr is replaced 
by ""'r, this equivalence is no longer true if tr is substituted by the strict 
preference >-f . 
6. 	 If tt is continuous for almost all t El, then tr is continuous for all 
t E 1 and for all n. That is, the sets {y E IR~ly tr x}, {yIY:::5r x}, and 
{ylV ""'r x} are dosed, whatever x E IR~ may be. 
7. 	 If is convex for almost all t El, then tr is also convex for all t E 1 and 
for all n. 
8. 	 If tt is monotone (resp. strictly monotone) for almost all t El, then tr 
is monotone (resp. strictly monotone) for all t E 1 and aH n. 
4.2 Main results 
In subsection 3.2, we have obtained several results concerning to sufficient condi­
tions (theorem 3.1 and coroHary 3.1) and necessary conditions (see the remarks at 
the end of the subsection) for an allocation f to belong to the core of the economy 
Ec , in terms of the core of di serete economies, for the average preference. 
In this subsection, our aim is to follow a similar path for the unanimous 
preference. For this we first state sufficient conditions for an allocation f to 
belong to the core of the economy Ec , in terms of the core of diserete economies. 
Theorem 4.1 Let f : 1 ~ IR~ be a continuous function that is a feasible allo­
cation in the economy Ec' If fn E Co1'e(E~) fo1' al! n 2: nO I then fE Co1'e(Ec)' 
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Proof. Let us assume that j tt Core(Ee ). Then, there exist a coalition S, and 
9 : S -t IR~, such that hg(t)d¡t(t) ~ hw(t)d¡t(t), and U(t,g(t)) > U(tJ(t)), 
for aH tES. As wn converges weakly to w in Ll(I), there exists no, such that 
hg(t)d¡J,(t) ~ hwn(t)d¡J,(t), for all n 2: no· Moreover, by Lusin's theorem we c~n 
choose S to be compact and 9 to be continuous on S (see Hildebrand (1974), 
page 140). 
By the continuity properties of U, j and g, there exists e > O sueh that, if 
¿ = (e, ... ,e) E IR~, then we have 
U(t,g(t)) - ~ > U(tJ(t) +€) +~, for all t E S 
Noticing that ¡n converges to j uniformly on S, there exists K a compact 
subset of IR~, such that j(S), g(S), jn(s) e K, and there exists nl = nl (e), su eh 
that j(t)+i 2: ¡n(t), for aH t E S and n 2: nl' So, by monotonicity of preferences 
we obtain that 
é é
U(t,g(t)) - 2 > U(tJn(t)) + 2' for aH t E S 
On the other hand, as U is eontinuous, there exists 8 = 8(é, K) such that, if 
1t - t' 1< 8, and x E K, then IU(t',x) - U(t, x) 1< ~. Let n2, such that 2-n2 < 8, 
and let Ti max{no, nI, n2}. Then, if n 2: Ti, and It - t' 1< 8, it is verified that 
U(t',g(t)) > U(t,g(t)) - ~ and U(t,jn(t)) + ~ > U(t'Jn(t)) 
Note that if n 2: n, then I t t' 1< 8 if t, t' E Ji, whatever i may be. 
Therefore, U(t',g(t)) > U(t',jn(t)) for aH n 2: Ti, and t,t' E Ji. So, we can 
eonclude that the coalition S blocks jn via 9 in the economy E~. 
Q.E.D. 
Rernark. \Ve have actually proved that if an allocation j is bloeked by the 
coalition S via 9 in the eeonomy Eel then jn is also blocked by the the same 
coalition S and via the same allocation 9 in the economy E~. 
This theorem 4.1 is a weaker version of theorem 3.1, in the case of unanimous 
preference. As we shall see in subsection 4.3, neither the continuity of j nor the 
continuity of U can be dropped. 
In order to find necessary conditions for an allocation j to belong to the core 
of the economy Ee , we need to state first sorne lemmas. 
Lernrna 4.1 Let S e Ji} with J-l(S) > O. Let g: S -t IR~ be a J-l-integrable junc­
tíon and let x E IR~, such that g(t) >-i x jor all tES. Then J-ltS)hg(t)d¡J,(t) >-i 
x. 
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Proof. Let A = {y E IR~ Iy >-i x}. First, let us show that A is a convex seto 
For this, let YIl Y2 E A. Then YI tt x, Y2 tt x for alrnost aH t E Ii and there 
exist SIl S2 e Ii 1 with J.l(S¡) > oand J.l(S2) > 0, such that YI >-t x, for aH 
t E S11 Y2 >-t x for aH t E S2. Let YA AYI + (1 A)Y2 with °< A < 1. By 
convexity of the preferences, there exist S~ e S11 S; e S2' with J.l(SD = J.l(SI) 
and J.l(S~) = J.l(S2), such that YA >-t x, for aH t E S' = S~ US;. So, YA E A. 
Therefore A is a convex seto The convexity theorern of Hüsseinov (1987) allow 
us to conclude that 
J.l/S) fsg(t)~(t) E co(g(S)) 
As g(S) e A, we have that J.l/s)fsg(t)~(t) >-i x. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4.2 Let f be afeasible allacation in the economy é~, such that f(t) = fi 
far all t E Ii, and far al{ i. If fE sn+I_Core(é;+I), then f E sn-Core(é;). 
Proof. Let us suppose that f ft. sn-Core(é~). In this case, there exist S E sn and 
9 : S -t IR~, such that fsg(t)~(t) ~ fswn(t)~(t) and g(t) >-~ f(t) for alrnost 
aH tES. By the definition of sn we have that there exists Ts e {1, ... , 2n} such 
that S UiETs Ii. That is, Ts is the set of types which form the coalition S. So, 
for each i E Ts it is verified that g( t) >-i fi for all t E Ii- For each i E TS1 let 
g¡ J.l(~f)lrg(t)~(t). Let us consider 9 : S -t IR~, given by g(t) =gi if tE Ii· 
Note that rg(t)~(t) = L J.lUi )g¡ = rg(t)~(t). By lernrna 4.1, gi >-7 f¡ for allls iETs ls 
i E Ts. This rneans that, for each i E Ts, it is verified that gi tt f¡ for alrnost aH 
t E Ii, and besides there exists Si e Ii, with J.l(S¡) > 0, such that gi >-t f¡ for 
aH t E Si. On the other hand, Ii = I;¡:'\ U1;,+1. 
Let the sets TI and T2 be defined as follows 
Note that Ts = TI UT2. \Ve distinguish two different cases. 
First, if Ts = TI = T21 then g(t) >-~+I f(t) for all tES. It is also verified 
that 
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So the coalition S blocks J via 9 in the economy &~+I. This is in contradiction 
with J E sn+1_Core(&~+I). 
Secondly, let us suppose TI .¡:. T2• For each i ~ TI (resp. for each i ~ T2) 
let us consider S2í-1 e 1~i:'l (resp. S2i e 1~i+1), with ft(S2i-l) = ft(S¡) (re;p. 
ft(S2i) = ft(S¡)). As g1. >-t Ji for all t E Si, then by continuity of the preferences 
we have that there exists 
a bounded function ri : Si -+ IR~, such that gi. ri(t) >-t Ji for aH t E Si. Let 
Ti = ( r1.(t)~(t). Let uS consider now 9 : S -+ IR~, defined as follows Js¡ 
g(t) in other case 

By construction, we have that fsg(t)~(t) =::; fswn+1(t)~(t). In fact, 

L:> ((1;1.:'\ \ S2i-d) g¡ + ¿ft ((1;i+1 \ S2i)) gi+ 
irtT¡ iriT2 
¿ft ((I;i+l \ Sd) gi + ¿ft ((1~i:'l \ Si)) g¡ + ¿ ft(Ti)gi 
iriT¡ iriT2 ieT¡nT2 
= ¿ ft(Ingi + ¿ft (1~i:'l U1~i+1) g¡ + ¿ft (1~i:'l U12'/1) gi 
ienT2 iriT¡ irtT2 
So, it is verified that 19(t)~(t) = ¿ ft(1ng¡ = 19(t)~(t). 
s ieTs s 
By continuity and monotony of the preferences, we obtain that g(t) >-~+1 J(t) 
for all tES. Therefore, J ~ sn+t Core(&:+l). 
Q.E.D. 
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Theorem 4.2 Let ñ be a positive integer number! and let f be a feasible alloca­
tion in the economyee! such that f(t) = fi for al! t E ir, i =1, ... , 2ñ . 
If f E S-Core(ec) , then f E sn-Core(e:), for all n ;:::: ñ. In particular, if 
f E COre(ee), then f E sn.Core(e:), for al! n ;;::: ñ. 
Proof. Let us suppose that f ~ sn-Core(e:), for sorne n ;;::: ñ. Then, there exist 
S E sn and 9 : S -+ IR~, such that hg(t)dp(t) :5 hwn(t)dp(t) and g(t) >-~ f(t) 
for aH tES. Let Ts e {1, ... , 2n }, such that S = UiETs Ii. We have that 
g(t) >-i fi for aH tE Ii, with i E Ts. For each i E Ts , let g¡ = Jt(~i)hg(t)dp(t). 
Let us consider 9 : S -+ IR~, given by g( t) = gi, if t E Ii. By construction, we 
obtain that hg(t)dp(t) = hg(t)dp(t). By lernma 4.1, it is verified that gi >-i fi, 
for aH i E Ts . By the definition of unanimous preference ti, this is equivalent 
to the fact that for each i E Ts there exists Si e Ii, with Jt(Si) > 0, such 
that gi t t Ji, for almost aH t E Ii and g¡ >-t fi, for aH t E Si. Therefore, the 
aHocation f is blocked by the coalition S in the economy ee' 
Q.E.D. 
4.3 Sorne counterexarnples 
Example 4.1. Our first example is similar to the example 3.1 and shows that 
the converse of theorem 4.1 is not true. 
By Cantor's nested intervals theorem \Ve can take Q as below. Let Q E 1, such 
that for infinitely many n nk and for aH i = i (n), with Q E Ir, it is verified 
that ai < Q < bi, being 
ai ~ e;-,n + ~ (2~) 
ai ~ e;-n1 ) + ~ C~) 
Note that this implies that l' ( {t E Ii It < Q}) < 21' ({t E Ii It > Q}) and besides 
l' ({ t E Iil t > Q}) < 21' ({t E lilt < Q}) . 
Let us consider the economy ee with the commodity space IR2• Each agent 
t E [0,1] is characterized by his initial endowment w(t) and his preference relation 
represented by the utility functíon U(t, (x,y)), defined as follows 
{ (1, O) ir t < Q
w(t) (0,1) if Q <t 
if t<Q{ 2x+yU(t, (x,y)) 
­
x+2y if Q < t 
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As in exarnple 3.1, it is easy to prove that the allocation f, given by f(t) = 
w(t), belongs to Core(&e)' However, the subsequence (nk) chosen before, verifies 
that fnk rt snk_Core(&~k) whatever nk rnay be. In fact, for each nk the coalition 
Snk = I;k blocks the allocation fnk vía 9nk in the econorny &~k, being 9nk (t), = 
f(t). To see this, observe that if t E ri k , then 
if t < a 
if t < a 
Therefore, if t E Snk' then f(t) is unanirnously prefered to fnk(t), for aH nk, 
because U(t,fn(t)) < U(t,j(t)), for all tE Snk' due to the fact that 
i-1 i } 2 n
max{a -- --a < -2­2n '2n 3 
Example 4.2. In example 4.1, \Ve can get that fn rt sn-Core(&~) for aH 
even number n, or fn rt sn-Core(&~) for aH odd number n, but not both of 
them sirnultaneously. No\V, as \Ve did in example 3.2, we define an economy &e, 
such that there exists f E Core(&c), but r rt sn-Core(&~) for aH n. 
Let us consider the economy &e with the comrnodity space IR2. Each agent 
t E 10,1] is characterized by his initial endowrnent w(t) and his preference relation 
represented by the utility function U(t, (x, y)), defined as foHows 
_ {(1, O) if t < a or t > (3
w(t) (O, 1) if a < t < (3 
2x + y if t < a or t > (3
U(t,(x,y)) { x + 2y if a < t < (3 
where a is chosen as in example 4.1 for aH odd n, and (3 satisfies for aH even n 
the following both inequalities: 
p ({ t E Irlt < (3}) < 2p ({ t E Irl t > (3}) 
p({t E Irlt > (3}) < 2p({t E Irl t < (3}) 
As in example 4.1, it is clear that the aHocation f, given by f(t) = w(t), 
belongs to Core(&e)' However, if n is an odd number (resp. n is an even nurnber), 
then the coalition Sn I¡\ with a E Ii (resp. with (3 E Ii) blocks the aHocation 
fn via 9n in the econorny &~, being 9n (t) = f (t). 
Example 4.3. As we have noticed earlier, the continuity of fin theorern 4.1 
can not be dropped. To prove this, let us consider a continuurn econorny fe with 
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two commodities, and let f{ be a Cantor subset of I, with p(f{) > O. For each 
agent t E I, let U( t, .) = (1 +x )l+~(t)(l y )l-~(t), where /3 : I ......r IR is a continuos 
function defined by 
00 
being I \ f{ = U(ak, bk)' 
k=l 
Let A = {t E II¡3(t) > O} and B = {t E II¡3(t) < O}. Let f{ = f{l Uf{2, with 
p(J{l) = P(J{2), and f{l nf{2 = 0. 
For each agent tE I let w(t) be his initial endowment, given by 
(1 + /,1 -/) if tE I{l 
(1-/,1+/) if tEf{2
w(t) (1, O) if t E A 
(0,1) if t E B 
It is easy to prove that if f{ e S, then the coalition S blocks the allocation 
f = w via g, defined by g(t) = (1,1) if t E f{, and g(t) = f(t) íf t E S \ f{. 
However, fn E eore(E:) for aH n. To prove this, let us assume that there 
exist a coalition S and an allocation g, such that fn(t) = (fl(t), f2'(t)) -<f 
g(t) = (gl(t),g2(t)). Then, it is verified gl(t) +g2(t) > fl(t)+ f2'(t), for all tE 5, 
which is a contradiction. 
To prove the last inequality, it is enough to notice that any Ii satisfies one of 
the three following facts: (a) Ii e A; (by Ii e B; (e) Ii nA i- 0and Ii nB i- 0. 
Let us consider i such that p(S nIi) > O. If (a) holds, then the agents of type 
i prefer commodity 1 better than commodity 2, but they have not any of it, so 
they verify the inequality. If (b) holds, then for a similar reason, the inequality 
is also verified for all t E Ii. Finally, if (e) holds, the inequality is verified for all 
t E Ii, because all the agents t E A (resp. t E B) prefer commodity 1 (resp. 2) 
better than 2 (resp. 1). 
Example 4.4. Example 4.3 shows that, in theorem 4.1, the continuity of 
f can not be dropped. Now we give an example which shows that neither the 
continuity of U can be deleted. 
For this, let A, B be disjoint subsets of I, such that p(Ji nA) > O and 
11( Ii nB) > O, for all n and i. For example, we can take A and B as follows 
2n00 2" 00 
A= UUAi, B= UUBi 
n=li=l n=li=l 
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such that Ai, Bi are non negligible Cantor subsets of Ir, verifying that 
Let us consider an economy Ce with two commodities. Each agent t E I is 
characterized by his endoment w(t) = (1,1), and his utility function, given by 
if t E A
. {2X + y 
U(t, (x,y)) = X + 2y if tE B 
U(t, (X, y)) if t E I \ (A UB) 
It is clear that the coalition S == A UB blocks the allocation ¡ =w. However, 
¡n E Core(c~), for all n. That is so because if g(t) = (gl(t),g2(t)) is unanimously 
prefered to (1,1) by all t E S, with I1(S) > O, then gl(t) +g2(t) > 2 for all tES. 
Example 4.5. In section 3, \Ve have considered a discrete approach to con­
tinuum economies, introducing the average preference. In that case, as a con se­
quence of corollary 3.2 and the results in Kannai (1970), we have obtained that, 
if ¡ E Core(ce), then for each é > Oit is verified that ¡n E é-Core(c~) for all 
n 2: no· 
Now, we give an example which proves that this result does not hold if we 
consider the unanimous preference as discrete approach. For this, let us see that 
the fact that an allocation ¡ belongs to Core(ce ) does not imply that for each 
E: > Oit is verified that ¡n belongs to é-Core(c~) for all n large enough. 
Let us consider a continuum economy Ce with a single commodity. Each agent 
tE I = [0,1] has as initial endowment w(t) E IR+, such that lw(t)dp.(t) = 1 and 
1 
1 2 w(t)dp.(t) = 2-1 + a, O< a::; 2-1. The preference relation of the agent t E I 
is represented by the utility function U(t, .), defined by 
U(t,x) = { X 
2-1 + t if x> 2-1 + t 
It is easy to prove that the allocation ¡, given by ¡(t) = 2-1 + t belongs to 
the core of the economy Ce' That is so because any agent t E I is satiated with 
the quantity ¡(t). However, if é < a, then ¡n f/:. é-Core(E~) for all n. In fact, 
\Ve claim that whatever n may be, we have that ¡n is blocked by the coalition 
S = [0,2-1 ) via g(t) = 1 for every tES. To prove our claim, let ti be the half 
point of the subinterval Ir. Then for all Ii e S, it is verified that g(t) = 1 is 
strictly prefered to ¡n(t) = 2-1 + ti for all agent t E (tr, ;n)' and both are 
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i - 1 ]indifferent for all the agents t E ~,ti .[ 
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